In order to beat any type of photon-number-splitting attack, we propose a protocol for quantum key distributoin (QKD) using 4 different intensities of pulses. They are vacuum and coherent states with mean photon number µ, µ ′ and µ s . µ s is around 0.55 and this class of pulses are used as the main signal states. The other two classes of coherent states are used for both decoy and signal. We have shown that, given the typical set-up in practice, the key rate from the main signal pulses is more than 77% to 89% of the theoretically allowed maximal rate in the case of overall transmittance of 10 −4 and 10 −3 .
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution(QKD) has drawn much attentions from scientists. Different from the classical cryptography, quantum key distribution(QKD) [1] [2] [3] can help two remote parties to set up the secure key by non-cloning theorem [4] . Further, proofs for the unconditional security over noisy channel have been given [5] [6] [7] [8] . The security of practical QKD with weak coherent states has also been shown [9, 12] . However there are still some limitations * Email address: wang@qci.jst.go.jp If the channel is not so lossy, Alice and Bob can still set-up the unconditionally secure final key with a key rate [12] 
if we use a random classical CSS code [5] to distill the final key [12] . Here t is the flipping error rate, ∆ is the fraction of tagged signals [12] , i.e. the fraction for those counts in cases when
Alice sends out a multi-photon pulse. The functional H(x) = −x log 2 x − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x).
From the above formula we see that a tight bound for ∆ is rather important in both key rate and the threshold of flipping rates.
It is possible to use single-photon source [10] in the next generation of practical QKD after the technique is fully matured, but it seems not likely in the near future. Moreover, it seems not to be the best choice from economic viewpoint. There are at least two realistic methods so far: strong-reference-light [14] method and decoy-state method [16] .
Originally, the PNS attack has been investigated where Alice and Bob monitor only how many non-vacuum signals arise, and how many errors happen. However, it was then shown [15] that the simple-minded method does guarantee the final security. It is shown [15] that in a typical parameter regime nothing changes if one starts to monitor the photon number statistics as Eve can adapt her strategy to reshape the photon number distribution such that it becomes Poissonian again. A very important method for was then proposed by Hwang [16] , where a method for unconditional verification of the multi-photon counting rate (MPCR) is given. Using Hwang's result, one can faithfully estimate the upper bound of ∆ through decoy-pulses, given whatever type of PNS attack. The value of upper bound estimated there is much decreased than that in worst-case estimation. However, Hwang's method does not produce a sufficiently tight bound, though it is an unconditional verification. For example, in the case of µ = 0.3, by Hwang's method, the the optimized verified upper bound of ∆ is 60.4%. With the value ∆ = 60.4%, by eq(2), the key rate must be low in practice.
Latter, the subject was extensively studied by Lo and co-workers and their result has been announced in a number conferences [17] . They have made three main observations: (1),
Using the framework of "decoy+GLLP [12] ", the security is clearly stated; (2), The dark count can be tested by using vacuum; (3), They proposed their main protocol : Try EVERY To see the TAMKR, we consider an ideal protocol:
Ideal protocol: Alice and Bob exactly uses N s single-photon pulses to test the transmittance and quantum bit error rate(QBER) of all single-photon pulses. The dark count is zero and the channel transmittance is η. They use coherent states to generate the key. Suppose the tested QBER is t ′ 1 and then they can upper-bound the QBER of those single-photon states in signal pulses by
They use coherent state with intensity µ to generate the key. According to eq.(2), the overall key rate is
They may choose an appropriate value µ to maximize R. For example, given t 1 = 0, maximized value is R = ηµe −µ at the point of µ = 1. In this papeer, we shall consider the typical case that the QBER is t 1 = 0.3 and for this value the TAMKR is R T AM KR = 0.149η (5) with µ = 0.572.
B. elementary results
In our protocol, the BB84 or other quantum-bit states are encoded in each coherent pulses (except for vacuum pulses.) What we shall study is not the BB84 state or other qubit state for cryptography itself, we shall only study how to overcome the PNS attack.
Alice switch the intensity (mean photon number) of each pulse randomly among 4 val- We first define the counting rate of any state ρ: the probability that Bob's detector clicks whenever a state ρ is sent out by Alice. We disregard what state Bob may receive here.
This counting rate is called as the yield in other literatures [16, 17] . For convenience, we always assume A dephased coherent state |µe iθ has the following convex form:
and c = 1 − e −µ − µe −µ > 0,
Similarly, state |µ ′ e iθ after dephasing is
and
u 2 e −µ ≥ 0. ρ d is a density operator. (We shall only use the fact that d is non-negative and ρ d is a density operator.) In deriving the above convex form, we have used the fact P n (µ ′ )/P 2 (µ ′ ) > P n (µ)/P 2 (µ) for all n > 2, given the conditions of eq.(6).
With these convex forms of density operators, it is equivalent to say that Alice sometimes sends nothing (|0 0|), sometimes sends |1 1|, sometimes sends ρ c , sometimes sends ρ d and so on, though Alice does not know which time she has sent out which one of these states. 
and s ρ (µ), s ρ (µ ′ ) are counting rates for state ρ from class Y µ and class Y µ ′ , respectively.
The coherent state ρ µ ′ is convexed by ρ c and other states. Given the condition of eq.(6), the probability of ρ c in state ρ µ ′ is larger than that in ρ µ . Therefore we can make a preliminary estimation of s c . From eq.(9) we immediately obtain
s 0 is known, s 1 and s d are unknown, but they can never be less than 0. Therefore we have
From eq. (7) we also have
Solving the above two constraints self-consistantly we have
In particular, in the case η << 1 and there is no Eve., Alice and Bob must be able to verify the following facts:
and, if we set µ ′ − µ → 0 we have
in the protocol. (In eq. (16) we have set s 0 = 0 for the clarity of the main issue. This is close to the real value in the case of normal lossy channel, which is 1 − e −µ , given that η << 1. From the above observation we can summarize two points: (1), Assymptotically, µ, µ ′ should be chosen close to each other so as to obtain a tight lower bound for s 1 . (2),
The over estimation of ∆ by our protocol is µ − (1 − e −µ ) = µ 2 /2. Therefore, the smaller µ is chosen, the tighter our verification of ∆, s 1 is. However, we can not choose to set µ or the protocol is very insecure: there is substentially non-negligible probability that the real value of s 1 for signal pulses is only a half of that. If we increase the number of pulses, the fluctuation becomes less, but can never be 0. Now we consider our problem, which is more complicated than the toy model.
C. numerical results of the protocol
In practice, our task is stated as this: to verify a tight lower bound of s 1 and the probability that the real value of s 1 for signal pulses in any class being less than the verified lower bound is exponentially close to 0.
The counting rate of any state ρ in class Y µ ′ now can be slightly different from the counting rate of the same state ρ from another class, Y µ , with non-negligible probability.
We shall use the primed notation for the counting rate for any state in class Y µ ′ and the original notation for the counting rate for any state in class Y µ . Explicitly, eq.(12,13) are now converted to
Setting s ′ x = (1 − r x )s x for x = 1, c and s
In the left side, if µ ′ and µ are too close, the factor of ∆ is very small. In the right side, if µ ′ − µ is too small, term r 1 s 1 will contribute effectively. Therefore, in practice, µ ′ and µ have to be a bit different. The important question here is whether there are reasonable values for µ ′ , µ so that our protocol can verify a tight lower bound of s 1 even though the number of pulses is finite. The answer is yes. Now the problem is actually this: given the normal case that they have found S µ = ηµ, S µ ′ = ηµ ′ , (i.e., there is no Eve.), how tightly they can lower bound s 1 . Given N 1 + N 2 copies of state ρ, suppose the counting rate for N 1 randomly chosen states is s ρ and the counting rate for the remained states is s , respectively and N is the number of pulses in class Y µ . From this we can also see that value µ itself cannot be set too small, otherwise the total number of single-photon pulses is too small therefore the fluctuation is severe. Since we assume the case where vacuum-counting rate is much less than S µ , we shall omit the effect of fluctuation in vacuum counting, i.e., we set r 0 = 0. With these inputs, eq. (17) Next, we shall calculate the phase-flip error rate of the single-photon pulses in class Y µ .
We borrow the following formula from Ref. [17] :
and E n is the phase-flip error rate of Fock state |n n|. E µ is the average phase-flip rate of class Y µ , which is detected by the protocol itself. After the lower bound of s 1 is determined already, we have
In normal cases, Alice and Bob will verify the fact 
and S µs is verified to be ηµ s ,
and s 1 (µ s ) ≥ (1 + r 1 )s 1 = (1 + 10e 
